Epistemological Naturalness: What is a Good Heuristic Strategy Good For?

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F18%3A50014296" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/18:50014296 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/LLP/article/view/LLP.2017.003" target="_blank" >http://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/LLP/article/view/LLP.2017.003</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2017.003" target="_blank" >10.12775/LLP.2017.003</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Epistemological Naturalness: What is a Good Heuristic Strategy Good For?

Original language description

According to the standard interpretation of Lewis’s theory of predicate meaning (the U&amp;N theory), the naturalness of meaning candidates should be stated metaphysically - as a length of definition in terms of fundamental properties. Recently, Weatherson has criticized the U&amp;N theory and argued that the criterion of naturalness should be stated epistemologically - as the amount of evidence needed to form a belief. Despite the criticism, his attitude towards the U&amp;N theory is quite relaxed. According to Weatherson, the U&amp;N theory can be used as a good heuristic for delivering the correct verdicts when doing applied semantics, i.e., when we try to determine the best meaning candidate for a particular predicate. In this paper, I try to show that the “good heuristic strategy” is of no use because A) there is no guarantee that the epistemological and the metaphysical criteria of naturalness deliver the same verdicts and B) even if they deliver the same verdicts, the difference in their theoretical backgrounds may affect arguments which rely on the verdicts. The difference will be shown by drawing on the example of Theodore Sider and his use of the U&amp;N theory.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_SC - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the SCOPUS database

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Project

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Continuities

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Publication year

2018

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Logic and logical philosophy

ISSN

1425-3305

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

27

Issue of the periodical within the volume

1

Country of publishing house

PL - POLAND

Number of pages

20

Pages from-to

85-104

UT code for WoS article

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EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85044004741