Chemical weapons of mass destruction and terrorism: a threat analysis
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F20%3A50016770" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/20:50016770 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819090-6.00007-6" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819090-6.00007-6</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819090-6.00007-6" target="_blank" >10.1016/B978-0-12-819090-6.00007-6</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Chemical weapons of mass destruction and terrorism: a threat analysis
Original language description
After the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States, the high risk of possible attacks with chemical weapons (CWs), especially by groups linked to jihadist terrorism, has been perceived. Before 9/11, in 1994 and 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a religious organization in Japan, used sarin (a nerve agent) in attacks in Matsumoto and on the Tokyo subway, causing a large number of casualties. These terrorist attacks had a large impact on the international chemical defense and intelligence communities, but not on other circles, perhaps because a chemical attack by a religious organization in Japan seemed something far removed from the reality of the rest of the world. But this changed after 9/11, when the mailing of letters containing Bacillus anthracis spores accompanied by images of the attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center towers increased the concern about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks, including attacks with CWs. In this chapter, information is analyzed from open sources regarding the possible use of CWs by terrorist groups, especially by those affiliated with the jihadist terrorism network. As religious terrorist groups, Al Qaeda and Daesh do not fit the assumption made by Brian Jenkins in 1975 that “terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins, 1975). This statement fits better with secular terrorist groups. But for religious terrorist groups, “divine duty” results in disappearance of moral restraints that would justify “a lot of people dead” in their terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 attacks. And if CWs are part of the WMD concept because they can cause a large number of casualties, they could be very good tools for jihadist terrorist groups to achieve their goals.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
C - Chapter in a specialist book
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50601 - Political science
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2020
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Book/collection name
Handbook of Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents
ISBN
978-0-12-819090-6
Number of pages of the result
16
Pages from-to
79-94
Number of pages of the book
1318
Publisher name
Elsevier
Place of publication
Oxford
UT code for WoS chapter
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