Understanding What We Ought and Shall Do: A Hyperstate Semantics for Descriptive, Prescriptive, and Intentional Sentences
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F21%3A50017632" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/21:50017632 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_11" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_11</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_11" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_11</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Understanding What We Ought and Shall Do: A Hyperstate Semantics for Descriptive, Prescriptive, and Intentional Sentences
Original language description
This essay is part of a larger project aimed at making sense of rational thought and agency as part of the natural world. It provides a semantic framework for thinking about the contents of: (1) descriptive thoughts and sentences having a representational or mind-to-world direction of fit, and which manifest our capacity for theoretical rationality; and (2) prescriptive and intentional sentences having an expressive or world-to-mind direction of fit, and which manifest our capacity for practical rationality. I use a modified version of Allan Gibbard’s hyperstate semantics, employing both maximally determinate possible worlds and maximally determinate plans of action, as a basis for providing a unified understanding of moral judgments and expressions of individual and collective intentionality – they one and all give voice to our ability as rational agents to adopt the perspectives of various individuals within a community and consider how we would behave were we in their positions. In the course of spelling out the view I draw on and criticize ideas that Wilfrid Sellars advanced in the middle of the twentieth century, while employing the tools of contemporary modal logic and model-theoretic semantics to give perspicuous formulation to his thought that the moral judgment ‘one ought to do A’ should be understood in terms of the collective intention ‘we shall do A’, where the pronoun denotes the unrestricted class of rational agents and the ‘ought’ is in some sense unconditionally binding.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
C - Chapter in a specialist book
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GF17-33808L" target="_blank" >GF17-33808L: Inferentialism and collective intentionality</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2021
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Book/collection name
Groups, Norms and Practices. Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality
ISBN
978-3-030-49589-3
Number of pages of the result
24
Pages from-to
215-238
Number of pages of the book
242
Publisher name
Springer
Place of publication
Cham, Switzerland
UT code for WoS chapter
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