Wherein is reasoning social?
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F21%3A50017634" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/21:50017634 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_7" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_7</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_7" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_7</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Wherein is reasoning social?
Original language description
One of the main tenets of inferentialism is that reasoning is primarily a competence to play the social game of giving and asking for reasons. A rather similar idea has recently been elaborated from the naturalistic perspective by Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber. They argue that reasoning evolved originally and primarily for the purposes of social justification and argumentation. In this chapter I compare the inferentialist account of reasoning with the approach of Mercier and Sperber. I argue that although Mercier-Sperber’s naturalistic hypothesis is promising, their account of how reasoning works faces a number of philosophical objections that inferentialism has the resources to overcome. At the same time, I show that “naturalized” inferentialists could find congenial much of what Mercier and Sperber have to say about the social origins and functions of reasoning. Finally, I consider a different naturalistic account of the social nature of reasoning due to Michael Tomasello, who submits that reasoning evolved primarily for cooperative argumentation and joint or collective decision-making. I argue that Tomasello’s account may go too far in the collectivist tradition and I conclude that a more plausible naturalistic account of the sociality of human reasoning would likely recognize a mix of different social contexts and functions of reasoning.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
C - Chapter in a specialist book
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GF17-33808L" target="_blank" >GF17-33808L: Inferentialism and collective intentionality</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2021
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Book/collection name
Groups, Norms and Practices. Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality
ISBN
978-3-030-49589-3
Number of pages of the result
28
Pages from-to
119-146
Number of pages of the book
242
Publisher name
Springer
Place of publication
Cham, Switzerland
UT code for WoS chapter
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