Simple games in Lukasiewicz calculus and their cores

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985556%3A_____%2F13%3A00393906" target="_blank" >RIV/67985556:_____/13:00393906 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/67985807:_____/13:00393906
Result on the web
<a href="http://dml.cz/handle/10338.dmlcz/143355" target="_blank" >http://dml.cz/handle/10338.dmlcz/143355</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Simple games in Lukasiewicz calculus and their cores
Original language description
We propose a generalization of simple coalition games in the context of games with fuzzy coalitions. Mimicking the correspondence of simple games with non-constant monotone formulas of classical logic, we introduce simple Lukasiewicz games using monotoneformulas of Lukasiewicz logic, one of the most prominent fuzzy logics. We study the core solution on the class of simple Lukasiewicz games and show that cores of such games are determined by finitely-many linear constraints only. The non-emptiness of core is completely characterized in terms of balanced systems and by the presence of strong veto players.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
BA - General mathematics
OECD FORD branch
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Project
<a href="/en/project/GAP402%2F12%2F1309" target="_blank" >GAP402/12/1309: A Multivalued Approach to Optima and Equilibria in Economics</a><br>
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2013
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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