On Cournot-Nash-Walras Equilibria and Their Computation

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985556%3A_____%2F16%3A00460895" target="_blank" >RIV/67985556:_____/16:00460895 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11228-016-0377-4" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11228-016-0377-4</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11228-016-0377-4" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11228-016-0377-4</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
On Cournot-Nash-Walras Equilibria and Their Computation
Original language description
This paper concerns a model of Cournot-Nash-Walras (CNW) equilibrium where the Cournot-Nash concept is used to capture equilibrium of an oligopolistic market with non-cooperative players/firms who share a certain amount of a so-called rare resource needed for their production, and the Walras equilibrium determines the price of that rare resource. We prove the existence of CNW equilibria under reasonable conditions and exam- ine their local stability with respect to small perturbations of problem data. In this way we show the uniqueness of CNW equilibria under mild additional requirements. Finally, we suggest some efficient numerical approaches and compute several instances of an illustrative test example.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
BA - General mathematics
OECD FORD branch
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Project
Result was created during the realization of more than one project. More information in the Projects tab.
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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