Consciousness of Judging. Katkov’s Critique of Marty’s State of Affairs and Brentano’s Description of Judgement
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F17%3A00481733" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/17:00481733 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480-011" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480-011</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480-011" target="_blank" >10.1515/9783110531480-011</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Consciousness of Judging. Katkov’s Critique of Marty’s State of Affairs and Brentano’s Description of Judgement
Original language description
This study presents Katkov’s critique of Marty’s theory of meaning and Brentano’s description of judgemental consciousness. Katkov, a student of Oskar Kraus in Prague, developed an interesting account of a reistic reduction of states of affairs. This reduction is based on Katkov’s transformation of Marty’s theory of the secondary intention of statements (linguistically expressed judgements) and on a further development of Brentano’s theory of judgements. According to Katkov’s theory, all linguistically expressed judgements have to manifest two independent judgements if they are to fulfil the communicative goal of a speaker. The first judgement is a basic acceptance or negation of an object. The second is a higher-order belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation. Katkov then reduces states of affairs to the consciousness of objective validity, which consists in such a belief in correctness. In this article I first present some features of Katkov’s critique of Marty’s theory of linguistic communication of statements. I then offer my own short reply to Katkov’s questions. The study concludes by presenting Katkov’s reduction of states of affairs to a complex of beliefs and by questioning Katkov’s description concerning the difference between sensory perception and rational judgement. This difference motivates Katkov’s separation of a basic acceptance or negation on the one side and a separate belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation on the other.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
C - Chapter in a specialist book
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA15-18149S" target="_blank" >GA15-18149S: From Logical Objectivism to Reism: Bolzano and the School of Brentano</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2017
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Book/collection name
Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty
ISBN
978-3-11-052977-7
Number of pages of the result
19
Pages from-to
241-259
Number of pages of the book
400
Publisher name
De Gruyter
Place of publication
Berlin
UT code for WoS chapter
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