Husserl's Early Reception of Bolzano's Theory of the Proposition in Itself
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F17%3A00483730" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/17:00483730 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://horizon.spb.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1398&lang=en" target="_blank" >http://horizon.spb.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1398&lang=en</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Husserl's Early Reception of Bolzano's Theory of the Proposition in Itself
Original language description
Even today, much of the development of Husserl’s interpretation of Bolzano’s philosophy prior to the Logical Investigations remains in the dark. However, recently published manuscripts from Husserl’s early period make it easier to understand Husserl’s original approach to Bolzano’s ideas. This article aims at describing one aspect of Husserl’s reception of Bolzano, namely his reception of the latter’s concept of propositions in themselves. It also corrects some errors concerning the traditional interpretation of Lotze’s and Frege’s influence on Husserl’s turn against psychologism. Whereas Husserl’s 1896 “Logic Lectures” employ a number of Bolzano’s terms and ideas, there is no trace of Lotze and almost no trace of Frege when the objectivity of logic is discussed. It is rather the integration of Bolzano’s famous concept of propositions in themselves that forms the core of Bolzano’s logical realism, into Husserl’s early phenomenology which drives Husserl’s move against the alleged psychologism of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. The article reconstructs Husserl’s early unsuccessful attempt to avoid the pitfall of psychologism by using a Brentanian theory of abstraction. This failure opened the way for a more positive appreciation of Bolzano’s concept of propositions in themselves. Such a concept posed problems for Husserl’s theory of judgment as inspired by Brentano, Stumpf, and Erdmann. Describing the twists and turns of the integration of Bolzano’s proposition in itself into Husserl’s work should contribute to a better understanding of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology, philosophy of logic, and, generally speaking, of the history of philosophy of the 19th and 20th century.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA15-18149S" target="_blank" >GA15-18149S: From Logical Objectivism to Reism: Bolzano and the School of Brentano</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2017
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology
ISSN
2226-5260
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
6
Issue of the periodical within the volume
2
Country of publishing house
RU - RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Number of pages
21
Pages from-to
100-120
UT code for WoS article
000435507800006
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85047806278