All

What are you looking for?

All
Projects
Results
Organizations

Quick search

  • Projects supported by TA ČR
  • Excellent projects
  • Projects with the highest public support
  • Current projects

Smart search

  • That is how I find a specific +word
  • That is how I leave the -word out of the results
  • “That is how I can find the whole phrase”

Husserl's Early Reception of Bolzano's Theory of the Proposition in Itself

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F17%3A00483730" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/17:00483730 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="http://horizon.spb.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1398&lang=en" target="_blank" >http://horizon.spb.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1398&lang=en</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Husserl's Early Reception of Bolzano's Theory of the Proposition in Itself

  • Original language description

    Even today, much of the development of Husserl’s interpretation of Bolzano’s philosophy prior to the Logical Investigations remains in the dark. However, recently published manuscripts from Husserl’s early period make it easier to understand Husserl’s original approach to Bolzano’s ideas. This article aims at describing one aspect of Husserl’s reception of Bolzano, namely his reception of the latter’s concept of propositions in themselves. It also corrects some errors concerning the traditional interpretation of Lotze’s and Frege’s influence on Husserl’s turn against psychologism. Whereas Husserl’s 1896 “Logic Lectures” employ a number of Bolzano’s terms and ideas, there is no trace of Lotze and almost no trace of Frege when the objectivity of logic is discussed. It is rather the integration of Bolzano’s famous concept of propositions in themselves that forms the core of Bolzano’s logical realism, into Husserl’s early phenomenology which drives Husserl’s move against the alleged psychologism of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. The article reconstructs Husserl’s early unsuccessful attempt to avoid the pitfall of psychologism by using a Brentanian theory of abstraction. This failure opened the way for a more positive appreciation of Bolzano’s concept of propositions in themselves. Such a concept posed problems for Husserl’s theory of judgment as inspired by Brentano, Stumpf, and Erdmann. Describing the twists and turns of the integration of Bolzano’s proposition in itself into Husserl’s work should contribute to a better understanding of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology, philosophy of logic, and, generally speaking, of the history of philosophy of the 19th and 20th century.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/GA15-18149S" target="_blank" >GA15-18149S: From Logical Objectivism to Reism: Bolzano and the School of Brentano</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2017

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology

  • ISSN

    2226-5260

  • e-ISSN

  • Volume of the periodical

    6

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    2

  • Country of publishing house

    RU - RUSSIAN FEDERATION

  • Number of pages

    21

  • Pages from-to

    100-120

  • UT code for WoS article

    000435507800006

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85047806278