Husserl (and Brentano) on Hume’s Notion of the Self

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F22%3A00562836" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/22:00562836 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_11" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_11</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_11" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_11</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Husserl (and Brentano) on Hume’s Notion of the Self
Original language description
Hynek Janoušek turns to the phenomenological tradition and Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Husserl’s phenomenology does not include either a unitary experienced self or a Kantian transcendental self, and he describes the self as a bundle. Husserl’s discussions of Hume form part of a wider appreciation of Hume in the German speaking world at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. There are, however, important differences between the constituents of our bundles for Hume and Husserl. For Husserl, the conscious contents of experience have intentionality, that is, they are experienced as directed at pumpkins and pencils, trees and patches of red, whereas for Hume, such impressions and ideas are described according to their intrinsic character. In the second edition of Logical Investigations, Husserl abandons Hume entirely, as he there comes to accept the existence of a pure unitary ego.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Project
<a href="/en/project/GA20-02972S" target="_blank" >GA20-02972S: Virtues, Old and New: Virtue Ethics in Hume and Mandeville</a><br>
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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