Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F24%3A00586286" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/24:00586286 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character
Original language description
Two important questions arise concerning the properties that constitute the phenomenal characters of our experiences: first, where these properties exist, and, second, whether they are tied to our consciousness of them. Such properties can either exist externally to the perceiving subject, or internally to her. This article argues that phenomenal characters, and specifically the phenomenal characters of colours, may exist independently of consciousness and that they are internal to the subject. We defend this combination of claims against a recent criticism according to which the unconscious phenomenal character of colours exists externally to the subject. We defend internalism about (potentially unconscious) phenomenal character by appealing to recent neuroscientific and behavioural evidence, and by rejecting the claim that externalism about phenomenal character is dialectically in a better position than internalism. In addition, we briefly present certain difficulties for externalist views of phenomenal character. These concern cases where the perceptual relation fails, but a perceptual experience still results. These points suffice to defuse the externalist critique of our view, and support the internalist variant of the consciousness-independence claim as the most plausible account of the unconscious phenomenal character of colours.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA20-14445S" target="_blank" >GA20-14445S: Dual models of phenomenal consciousness</a><br>
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Synthese
ISSN
0039-7857
e-ISSN
1573-0964
Volume of the periodical
203
Issue of the periodical within the volume
5
Country of publishing house
DE - GERMANY
Number of pages
18
Pages from-to
169
UT code for WoS article
001221341300001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85192882049