Psychology and Neuroscience. The (New) Autonomy Question

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F25%3A00588329" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/25:00588329 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00833-4" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00833-4</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00833-4" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10670-024-00833-4</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Psychology and Neuroscience. The (New) Autonomy Question

Original language description

The traditional thesis of the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience is grounded in a metaphysical thesis, the irreducibility thesis. Anti-reductionism is still dominant nowadays, and, as a consequence, autonomists arguably stand on firmer grounds. Still, an anti-autonomist might have the intuition that even if psychology is not reducible to neuroscience, there is a sense, not metaphysically grounded, but epistemologically grounded, in which psychology clearly is not autonomous from neuroscience. The challenge is then to offer a concept of autonomy which allows for the articulation of a new and significant autonomy thesis, and to show that the thesis is false. The thesis that psychologists need not consider neuroscientific explanations when putting forward psychological explanations is such a thesis. I take it that both this characterization of autonomy and an antiautonomist argument in this sense can already be found in a paper co-authored by Gualtiero Piccinini and CarlCraver. Piccinini and Craver’s attack on this thesis is grounded on the claim that psychologists should support their functional analyses by means ofmechanistic explanations for the former to be justified at all. I also take it that, as Lawrence Shapiro has shown, their argument ultimately fails. But this was a very valuable attempt, and, in this paper, I intend to build on it with the aim of offering a new and hopefully effective anti-autonomist argument. I contend that psychologists do need to consider neuroscientific explanations when putting forward psychological explanations, and this stems from the fact that they provide the same type of explanations of the same kind of phenomena as neuroscientist, or so I argue.

Czech name

—

Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

50101 - Psychology (including human - machine relations)

Project

<a href="/en/project/GA20-14445S" target="_blank" >GA20-14445S: Dual models of phenomenal consciousness</a><br>

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2025

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Erkenntnis

ISSN

0165-0106

e-ISSN

1572-8420

Volume of the periodical

90

Issue of the periodical within the volume

7

Country of publishing house

DE - GERMANY

Number of pages

20

Pages from-to

2909-2928

UT code for WoS article

001282851300003

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85200155659