Neurophenomenal structuralism as a general theory of consciousness?

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F25%3A00639631" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/25:00639631 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2025.11821" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2025.11821</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2025.11821" target="_blank" >10.33735/phimisci.2025.11821</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Neurophenomenal structuralism as a general theory of consciousness?

Original language description

While neurophenomenal structuralism (NPS) is typically viewed as an account of why an experience, i.e. a conscious mental state, has a specific phenomenal character, Sascha Fink has suggested that NPS might also account for why one has an experience in the first place. According to Fink, the character-determining structures are incorporated in larger (meta-)structures that make the incorpo- rated structures conscious, while also contributing their own Gestalt-related phenomenology. We examine the commitments of such generalized ‘NPS+’, for- mulating three challenges for Fink’s approach. According to the unconsciously perceived gist objection, there is evidence for unconscious Gestalten, which sug-gests that the Gestalt-forming mechanism fails to make the relevant mental state conscious. Moreover, the existence of Ganzfeld experiences suggests that some experiences lack Gestalt-structures. Thirdly, as we explain, proponents of one-factor NPS+ face the mirroring dilemma of having to choose between a vicious regress of incorporating structures, and compromising their theory’s methodological promise. We then formulate two challenges for any two-factor form of NPS+: The more of the same challenge concerns the question of why adding more structures to content-related structural features makes these fea-tures conscious, while the structure-selection challenge concerns the question of why some neural structures, but not others, are selected for consciousness.

Czech name

—

Czech description

—

Type

J_SC - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the SCOPUS database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Project

<a href="/en/project/GA25-16186S" target="_blank" >GA25-16186S: Monism and the Subjectivity Challenge</a><br>

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2025

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences

ISSN

2699-0369

e-ISSN

—

Volume of the periodical

—

Issue of the periodical within the volume

6

Country of publishing house

DE - GERMANY

Number of pages

18

Pages from-to

—

UT code for WoS article

—

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-105018939924