Contagion through learning

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F08%3A00343729" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/08:00343729 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Contagion through learning

Original language description

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the current ones. Contagion may lead to unique long-run outcomes where multiplicity would occur if players learned through repeatedly playing the same game. The process of contagion through learning is formally related to contagion in global games, although the outcomes generally differ.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_x - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

CEP classification

AH - Economics

OECD FORD branch

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Project

<a href="/en/project/LC542" target="_blank" >LC542: Center of Advanced Political Economy Research</a><br>

Continuities

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Publication year

2008

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Theoretical economics

ISSN

1555-7561

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

3

Issue of the periodical within the volume

4

Country of publishing house

US - UNITED STATES

Number of pages

28

Pages from-to

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UT code for WoS article

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EID of the result in the Scopus database

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