Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F09%3A00328357" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/09:00328357 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case

Original language description

We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication and optimal delegation: a principal-agent model with hidden information, no monetary transfers, and single-peaked preferences.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_x - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

CEP classification

AH - Economics

OECD FORD branch

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Project

<a href="/en/project/LC542" target="_blank" >LC542: Center of Advanced Political Economy Research</a><br>

Continuities

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Publication year

2009

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Journal of Economic Theory

ISSN

0022-0531

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

144

Issue of the periodical within the volume

4

Country of publishing house

US - UNITED STATES

Number of pages

23

Pages from-to

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UT code for WoS article

000268461600001

EID of the result in the Scopus database

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