Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F09%3A00331498" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/09:00331498 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
Original language description
We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)
Others
Publication year
2009
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Games and Economic Behavior
ISSN
0899-8256
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
67
Issue of the periodical within the volume
2
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
9
Pages from-to
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UT code for WoS article
000271143900006
EID of the result in the Scopus database
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