Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F13%3A00391313" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/13:00391313 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.014" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.014</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.014" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.014</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems
Original language description
We study a dynamic coordination process in which agents are uncertain about the actions of their fellow agents, and anticipate strategically relevant information. Because of the uncertainty and learning, (ir)reversibility of actions has important strategic consequences. We find that the reversibility option can either enhance or hamper efficient coordination, and we characterize the direction of the effect based solely on simple features of the coordination problem. The analysis is based on the following generalization of the Laplacian property known from static global games: agents at the beginning of the dynamic game act as if they were entirely uninformed about the aggregate play of fellow agents in each stage of the coordination process.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2013
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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