Why can't a woman bid more like a man?

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F13%3A00391319" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/13:00391319 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11640/13:00423392
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Why can't a woman bid more like a man?
Original language description
We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men doin the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the entire course of the menstrual cycle, bidding of contraceptive pill users follows a sine-like pattern throughout the menstrual cycle, with higher than average bidding in the follicular phase and lower than average bidding in the luteal phase. In comparison, pill non-users have a flat bidding profile throughout the cycle.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—

Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2013
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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