Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F14%3A00429243" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/14:00429243 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
Original language description
In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates viaan indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2014
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Games and Economic Behavior
ISSN
0899-8256
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
87
Issue of the periodical within the volume
September
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
14
Pages from-to
122-135
UT code for WoS article
000343391800008
EID of the result in the Scopus database
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