When is it optimal to delegate: the theory of fast-track authority

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F15%3A00441137" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/15:00441137 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11640/15:00441343
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140031" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140031</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140031" target="_blank" >10.1257/mic.20140031</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
When is it optimal to delegate: the theory of fast-track authority
Original language description
With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the President by committing not to amend a trade agreement. Why would it cede such power? We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. In our model: (i) FTA is never granted if an industry operates in the majority of districts; (ii) The more symmetric the industrial pattern, the more likely is FTA, since competition for protectionist rents is most punishing when bargaining power is symmetrically distributed; (iii) Widely disparate initial tariffs prevent free trade even with FTA.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—

Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—

Project
<a href="/en/project/GAP402%2F12%2F0666" target="_blank" >GAP402/12/0666: A Dynamic Analysis of Trade Policy Formation</a><br>
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2015
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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