In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F15%3A00449394" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/15:00449394 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0884-5" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0884-5</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0884-5" target="_blank" >10.1007/s00355-015-0884-5</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments

Original language description

We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation if(i) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii) punishment cannot be avenged. We use a design that imposes minimal restrictions on who can punish whom or when, and allows participants to employ a wide range of punishment strategies including retaliation of punishment.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_x - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

CEP classification

AH - Economics

OECD FORD branch

—

Project

—

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2015

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Social Choice and Welfare

ISSN

0176-1714

e-ISSN

—

Volume of the periodical

45

Issue of the periodical within the volume

3

Country of publishing house

DE - GERMANY

Number of pages

17

Pages from-to

561-577

UT code for WoS article

000363044200005

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-84944147561