Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F16%3A00497239" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/16:00497239 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
Original language description
Centipede games represent a classic example of a strategic situation, where the equilibrium prediction is at odds with human behavior. This study is explicitly designed to discriminate among the proposed explanations for initial responses in Centipede games. Using many different Centipede games, our approach determines endogenously whether one or more explanations are empirically relevant. We nd that non-equilibrium behavior is too heterogeneous to be explained by a single model. However, most non-equilibrium choices can be fully explained by level-k thinking and quantal response equilibrium, in roughly equal proportions. Preference-based models play a negligible role in explaining non-equilibrium play.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
O - Miscellaneous
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA14-22044S" target="_blank" >GA14-22044S: Learning and Networks</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů