Rational inattention dynamics: inertia and delay in decision-making

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F17%3A00482023" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/17:00482023 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11620/17:10367079 RIV/00216208:11640/17:00475640
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13636" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13636</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13636" target="_blank" >10.3982/ECTA13636</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Rational inattention dynamics: inertia and delay in decision-making
Original language description
We solve a general class of dynamic rational inattention problems in which an agent repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions. The solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model, but it is biased toward an optimal default rule that is independent of the realized state. The model provides the same fit to choice data as dynamic logit, but, because of the bias, yields different counterfactual predictions. We apply the general solution to the study of (i) the status quo bias, (ii) inertia in actions leading to lagged adjustments to shocks, and (iii) the tradeoff between accuracy and delay in decision-making.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory

Project
Result was created during the realization of more than one project. More information in the Projects tab.
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2017
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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