Optimal menu when agents make mistakes
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F20%3A00533006" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/20:00533006 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp670.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp670.pdf</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Optimal menu when agents make mistakes
Original language description
This paper studies a welfare maximization problem with heterogeneous agents. A social planner designs a menu of choices for agents who misperceive either the properties of options or their own preferences. When agents misperceive the true properties of alternatives, it is optimal to limit a menu when the probability of a mistaken choice is moderately high. Additionally, it could be optimal to construct the menu with more distinct alternatives. However, when agents misperceive their own tastes, it is optimal to limit choice only when agents choose randomly, and to propose alternatives that are more similar when there is a greater probability of agents making a mistake.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
O - Miscellaneous
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2020
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů