Setting interim deadlines to persuade
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F22%3A00563015" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/22:00563015 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11640/22:00563016
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp734.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp734.pdf</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Setting interim deadlines to persuade
Original language description
This paper studies the optimal design of self-reporting on the progress of a project by a rent-seeking agent reporting to a principal who is concerned with accomplishing the project before an exogenous deadline. The project has two stages: completing the first stage serves as a milestone and completing the second stage accomplishes the project. I show that if the project is sufficiently promising ex ante, then the agent commits to provide only the good news that the project is accomplished. If the project is not promising enough ex ante, the agent persuades the principal to start the funding by committing to provide not only good news but also the bad news that the milestone of the project has not been reached by an interim deadline.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
O - Miscellaneous
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA20-27630S" target="_blank" >GA20-27630S: Information Design in Contests</a><br>
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů