Contractor default: predictions, politics, and penalties in the procurement process

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F22%3A00563986" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/22:00563986 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12359" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12359</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/apce.12359" target="_blank" >10.1111/apce.12359</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Contractor default: predictions, politics, and penalties in the procurement process
Original language description
In this study, we provide an analysis of federal contractor default. We examine both the predictability and the consequences of contractor default. We discover that a firm's political contributions, size, sales derived from government contracts, and primary industry concentration are positively related to default, while the average quality of firm contracts and liquidity are negatively related to default. Production of a product rather than service delivery, the number of modifications, and the requirement of a subcontractor are positively related to contract default. Department of Defense contracts and the use of commercial item procedures are negatively related to default. Defaulting firms tend to receive smaller contracts after default. To mitigate possible punishment, defaulting firms increase their political contributions, especially to congressional candidates.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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