Normativity and Reason-Dependence; A Comment on the Nature of Reasons

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68378122%3A_____%2F13%3A00397288" target="_blank" >RIV/68378122:_____/13:00397288 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4476/74761" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4476/74761</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4476/74761" target="_blank" >10.4476/74761</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Normativity and Reason-Dependence; A Comment on the Nature of Reasons
Original language description
In his recent From Normativity to Responsibility Joseph Raz argues for three features of practical reasons: that they are facts; that they are facts that can motivate agents qua being reasons; and that they motivate agents in virtue of agents? capacity to reflect on them as reasons (which he labels Reason?). The paper identifies a tension between two conceptions of normativity that seem to co-exist in Raz?s account: on the first of them, reasons remain psychologically efficacious albeit too subjective;the other, takes reasons to be objective normative facts which exist independently of our practical reasoning (or Reason). I caution against a conflation between mind-dependence (psychologism) and Reasondependence and suggest that practical reasons can remain simultaneously objective and motivating if we understand them in a Reason-dependent fashion. In the course of the paper a number of related questions on the nature of reasons are discussed and clarified.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AG - Legal sciences
OECD FORD branch
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Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2013
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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