Game Theoretic Model of Strategic Honeypot Selection in Computer Networks
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F12%3A00197018" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/12:00197018 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://www.springer.com/computer/database+management+%26+information+retrieval/book/978-3-642-34265-3" target="_blank" >http://www.springer.com/computer/database+management+%26+information+retrieval/book/978-3-642-34265-3</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_12" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_12</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Game Theoretic Model of Strategic Honeypot Selection in Computer Networks
Original language description
A honeypot is a decoy computer system used in network security to waste the time and resources of attackers and to analyze their behaviors. While there has been significant research on how to design honeypot systems, less is known about how to use honeypots strategically in network defense. Based on formal deception games, we develop two game-theoretic models that provide insight into how valuable should honeypots look like to maximize the probability that a rational attacker will attack a honeypot. Thefirst model captures a static situation and the second allows attackers to imperfectly probe some of the systems on the network to determine which ones are likely to be real systems (and not honeypots) before launching an attack. We formally analyze theproperties of the optimal strategies in the games and provide linear programs for their computation. Finally, we present the optimal solutions for a set of instances of the games and evaluate their quality in comparison to several baseli
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
D - Article in proceedings
CEP classification
IN - Informatics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GAP202%2F12%2F2054" target="_blank" >GAP202/12/2054: Security Games in Extensive Form</a><br>
Continuities
V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju
Others
Publication year
2012
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Article name in the collection
Decision and Game Theory for Security
ISBN
978-3-642-34265-3
ISSN
0302-9743
e-ISSN
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Number of pages
20
Pages from-to
201-220
Publisher name
Springer-Verlag, GmbH
Place of publication
Heidelberg
Event location
Budapest
Event date
Nov 5, 2012
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
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