Practical Performance of Refinements of Nash Equilibria in Extensive-Form Zero-Sum Games
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F14%3A00221854" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/14:00221854 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/36940" target="_blank" >http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/36940</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-419-0-201" target="_blank" >10.3233/978-1-61499-419-0-201</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Practical Performance of Refinements of Nash Equilibria in Extensive-Form Zero-Sum Games
Original language description
Nash equilibrium (NE) is the best known solution concept used in game theory. It is known that NE is particularly weak even in zero-sum extensive-form games since it can prescribe irrational actions to play that do not exploit mistakes made by an imperfect opponent. These issues are addressed by a number of refinements of NE that strengthen the requirements for equilibrium strategies. However, a thorough experimental analysis of practical performance of the Nash equilibria refinement strategies is, to the best of our knowledge, missing. This paper aims to fill this void and provides the first broader experimental comparison of the quality of refined Nash strategies in zero-sum extensive-form games. The experimental results suggest that (1) there is a significant difference between the best and the worst NE strategy against imperfect opponents, (2) the existing refinements outperform the worst NE strategy, (3) they typically perform close to the best possible NE strategy, and (4) the di
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
D - Article in proceedings
CEP classification
IN - Informatics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GAP202%2F12%2F2054" target="_blank" >GAP202/12/2054: Security Games in Extensive Form</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2014
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Article name in the collection
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
ISBN
978-1-61499-418-3
ISSN
0922-6389
e-ISSN
—
Number of pages
6
Pages from-to
201-206
Publisher name
IOS Press
Place of publication
Amsterdam
Event location
Praha
Event date
Aug 18, 2014
Type of event by nationality
EUR - Evropská akce
UT code for WoS article
000349444700035