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Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F15%3A00221582" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/15:00221582 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10951-014-0393-x" target="_blank" >http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10951-014-0393-x</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10951-014-0393-x" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10951-014-0393-x</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times

  • Original language description

    This paper considers a project scheduling environment in which the activities of the project network are partitioned among a set of agents. Activity durations are controllable, i.e., every agent is allowed to shorten the duration of its activities, incurring a crashing cost. If the project makespan is reduced with respect to its normal value, a reward is offered to the agents and each agent receives a given ratio of the total reward. Agents want to maximize their profit. Assuming a complete knowledge ofthe agents? parameters and of the activity network, this problem is modeled as a non-cooperative game and Nash equilibria are analyzed. We characterize Nash equilibria in terms of the existence of certain types of cuts on the project network. We show that finding one Nash equilibrium is easy, while finding a Nash strategy that minimizes the project makespan is NP-hard in the strong sense. The particular case where each activity belongs to a different agent is also studied and some polyn

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

  • CEP classification

    BB - Applied statistics, operational research

  • OECD FORD branch

Result continuities

  • Project

  • Continuities

    I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Others

  • Publication year

    2015

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Journal of Scheduling

  • ISSN

    1094-6136

  • e-ISSN

  • Volume of the periodical

    18

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    1

  • Country of publishing house

    NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

  • Number of pages

    13

  • Pages from-to

    15-27

  • UT code for WoS article

    000347896300003

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-84926613251