Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F15%3A00221582" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/15:00221582 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10951-014-0393-x" target="_blank" >http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10951-014-0393-x</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10951-014-0393-x" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10951-014-0393-x</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
Original language description
This paper considers a project scheduling environment in which the activities of the project network are partitioned among a set of agents. Activity durations are controllable, i.e., every agent is allowed to shorten the duration of its activities, incurring a crashing cost. If the project makespan is reduced with respect to its normal value, a reward is offered to the agents and each agent receives a given ratio of the total reward. Agents want to maximize their profit. Assuming a complete knowledge ofthe agents? parameters and of the activity network, this problem is modeled as a non-cooperative game and Nash equilibria are analyzed. We characterize Nash equilibria in terms of the existence of certain types of cuts on the project network. We show that finding one Nash equilibrium is easy, while finding a Nash strategy that minimizes the project makespan is NP-hard in the strong sense. The particular case where each activity belongs to a different agent is also studied and some polyn
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
BB - Applied statistics, operational research
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2015
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Journal of Scheduling
ISSN
1094-6136
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
18
Issue of the periodical within the volume
1
Country of publishing house
NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Number of pages
13
Pages from-to
15-27
UT code for WoS article
000347896300003
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-84926613251