Computing Maxmin Strategies in Extensive-form Zero-sum Games with Imperfect Recall

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F17%3A00315209" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/17:00315209 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0006121200630074" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0006121200630074</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0006121200630074" target="_blank" >10.5220/0006121200630074</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Computing Maxmin Strategies in Extensive-form Zero-sum Games with Imperfect Recall

Original language description

Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative theoretical results: a Nash equilibrium does not have to exist, computing maxmin strategies is NP-hard, and they may require irrational numbers. We present the first algorithm for approximating maxmin strategies in two-player zero-sum imperfect recall games without absentmindedness. We modify the wellknown sequence-form linear program to model strategies in imperfect recall games resulting in a bilinear program and use a recent technique to approximate the bilinear terms. Our main algorithm is a branch-andbound search that provably reaches the desired approximation after an exponential number of steps in the size of the game. Experimental evaluation shows that the proposed algorithm can approximate maxmin strategies of randomly generated imperfect recall games of sizes beyond toy-problems within few minutes.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

D - Article in proceedings

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Project

<a href="/en/project/GA15-23235S" target="_blank" >GA15-23235S: Abstractions and Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Recall</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year

2017

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2

ISBN

978-989-758-220-2

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

—

Number of pages

12

Pages from-to

63-74

Publisher name

SciTePress - Science and Technology Publications

Place of publication

Porto

Event location

Porto

Event date

Feb 24, 2017

Type of event by nationality

WRD - Celosvětová akce

UT code for WoS article

000413244200006