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Hybrid Mechanisms for On-Demand Transpor

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F19%3A00339528" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/19:00339528 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2018.2886579" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2018.2886579</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2018.2886579" target="_blank" >10.1109/TITS.2018.2886579</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Hybrid Mechanisms for On-Demand Transpor

  • Original language description

    Market mechanisms are now playing a key role in the allocation and pricing of on-demand transportation services. In practice, most such services use posted-price mechanisms, where both passengers and drivers are offered a journey price which they can accept or reject. However, providers such as Liftago and GrabTaxi have begun to adopt a mechanism whereby auctions are used to price drivers. These latter mechanisms are neither posted-price nor classical double auctions and can instead be considered a hybrid mechanism. In this paper, we describe and study the properties of a novel hybrid on-demand transport mechanism. As these mechanisms require knowledge of passenger demand, we analyze the data-profit tradeoff as well as how the passenger and driver preferences influence mechanism performance. We show that the revenue loss revenue for the provider scales with root n log n for n passenger requests under a multi-armed bandit learning algorithm with beta-distributed preferences. We also investigate the effect of subsidies on both profit and the number of successful journeys allocated by the mechanism, comparing these with a posted-price mechanism, showing improvements in profit with a comparable number of successful requests.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Result continuities

  • Project

    Result was created during the realization of more than one project. More information in the Projects tab.

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2019

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems

  • ISSN

    1524-9050

  • e-ISSN

    1558-0016

  • Volume of the periodical

    20

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    12

  • Country of publishing house

    US - UNITED STATES

  • Number of pages

    13

  • Pages from-to

    4500-4512

  • UT code for WoS article

    000505522400020

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85077208854