Differential Game Strategies for Social Networks With Self-Interested Individuals
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F24%3A00374541" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/24:00374541 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736" target="_blank" >10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Differential Game Strategies for Social Networks With Self-Interested Individuals
Original language description
A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash equilibrium allows for self-enforcing strategic interactions between selfish and self-interested individuals. This article presents a differential game approach to the opinion formation problem in social networks to investigate the evolution of opinions as a result of a Nash equilibrium. The opinion of each individual is described by a differential equation, which is the continuous-time Hegselmann-Krause model for opinion dynamics with a time delay in input. The objective of each individual is to seek optimal strategies for its own opinion evolution by minimizing an individual cost function. Two differential game problems emerge, one for a population that is not stubborn and another for a population that is stubborn. The open-loop Nash equilibrium actions and their associated opinion trajectories are derived for both differential games using Pontryagin's principle. Additionally, the receding horizon control scheme is used to practice feedback strategies where the information flow is restricted by fixed and complete social graphs, as well as the second neighborhood concept. The game strategies were executed on the well-known Zachary's Karate Club social network and a representative family opinion network. The resulting opinion trajectories associated with the game strategies showed consensus, polarization, and disagreement in final opinions.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—
Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA23-07517S" target="_blank" >GA23-07517S: Agile swarms of aerial robots with reliable multimodal sensing and state-estimation capabilities</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
ISSN
2329-924X
e-ISSN
2329-924X
Volume of the periodical
11
Issue of the periodical within the volume
3
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
14
Pages from-to
4426-4439
UT code for WoS article
001167335800001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85183984571