An Aristotelian Argument Against Bare Particulars

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F12%3A10107546" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/12:10107546 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
An Aristotelian Argument Against Bare Particulars
Original language description
The text provides an Aristotelian-inspired argument against the thesis that particulars do not have any (non-trivial) de re necessary properties. This anti-essentialist claim is addressed in the form it takes within the implicit ontology of the Transparent Inten-sional Logic (TIL) of Pavel Tichý, the most developed logical formalism based on Fregean fundaments up to date. The author sets out to show that given the reality of "accidental change" (or any contingent variation across time or possible worlds), there must be tropes or particular accidental forms - quite irrespectively of any assumptions concerning the nature of universals. Since the tropes must ultimately differ essentially, it follows that there are many essentially distinct natural kinds of particulars, so that insistence on essential sameness of substances turns out as unwarranted. The article concludes with some general thoughts concerning the relationship between ontology and logic. The author defends the view that our
Czech name
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Czech description
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Project
<a href="/en/project/GAP401%2F11%2F0906" target="_blank" >GAP401/11/0906: Chances of Realist Epistemology in the Face of Modern Critique</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2012
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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