How Russell Did Not Abandon Russelian Propositions

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F15%3A10296763" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/15:10296763 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
How Russell Did Not Abandon Russelian Propositions
Original language description
Recommending that one treat propositions as incomplete symbols, Russell departed from his earlier theory about propositions in 1910. According to one frequently endorsed interpretation, he maintained that ontological commitments to false propositions asobjective entities cannot be reconciled with the associated theory of propositional unity. I explain that the versions of this interpretation in Sainsbury (1979) and Linsky (1993, 1999) are incorrect from exegetical reasons. The objection they ascribe tolater Russell is based on the so-called 'unity argument'. I also argue against Weiss (1995) and Lebens (2009) who endorse the unity argument independently on exegesis of Russell's texts. In the course of my argument, I outline Russell's primitivist views about unity and truth. I elaborate on his theory of unity and develop a sort of redundancy account of unity which I consider to be a correct answer to the problem of unity inherited from Bradley-Russell dispute.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Publication year
2015
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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