Tullock's puzzle in pay-and-play lobbying

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F16%3A10326602" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/16:10326602 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecpo.12082/full" target="_blank" >http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecpo.12082/full</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12082" target="_blank" >10.1111/ecpo.12082</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Tullock's puzzle in pay-and-play lobbying
Original language description
We explain Tullock's puzzle of small payments from special interests to policymakers by the hold-up problem between the two parties. We construct a simple lobbying environment where an uninformed policy-maker is a price-setter who sells access to two opposed and privately informed lobbyists. The key equilibrium property is "the curse of the ex ante favored lobbyist"; the lobbyist proposing a project with the higher expected public value ends up worse off than the lobbyist proposing a project with the lower expected public value.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—

Project
<a href="/en/project/GBP402%2F12%2FG097" target="_blank" >GBP402/12/G097: DYME-Dynamic Models in Economics</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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