Ex-ante targeting in lobbying strategies: an experimental study

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F17%3A00096086" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/17:00096086 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Ex-ante targeting in lobbying strategies: an experimental study
Original language description
As lobbying is currently an activity necessary for many interest groups including non-profit organizations, it is important to analyze a variety of potential strategies lobbyists may apply. We conducted a replication of a previous experiment to see whether theories about the ex-ante targeting of different policymakers hold. In the experiment, either two or three players of two types bid on simulated policymakers in order to succeed. In this article, we analyze two basic strategies – the theories of coalition expansion and counteractive lobbying – in terms of how often lobbyists target ex-ante supporters, the opposition, and undecided policymakers. We also focused on the size of lobbyist expenditures. Our investigation suggests that neither of the investigated strategies prevailed and other strategies may be naturally used by lobbyists.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Publication year
2017
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection
Proceedings of the 21st International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research 2017.
ISBN
9788021084483
ISSN
2336-1239
e-ISSN
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Number of pages
7
Pages from-to
20-26
Publisher name
Masaryk University
Place of publication
Brno
Event location
Šlapanice
Event date
Jan 19, 2017
Type of event by nationality
EUR - Evropská akce
UT code for WoS article
000402427100002

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