Manipulability of Voting Procedures: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F16%3A10328654" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/16:10328654 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_9" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_9</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_9" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_9</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Manipulability of Voting Procedures: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination
Original language description
In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—

Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection
Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII
ISBN
978-3-662-52885-3
ISSN
0302-9743
e-ISSN
—
Number of pages
8
Pages from-to
141-148
Publisher name
Springer
Place of publication
Berlin
Event location
Wroclaw
Event date
Nov 20, 2015
Type of event by nationality
EUR - Evropská akce
UT code for WoS article
000386606200009

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