Voting experiments: measuring vulnerability of voting procedures to manipulation

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F11%3A00368085" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/11:00368085 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/119" target="_blank" >http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/119</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Voting experiments: measuring vulnerability of voting procedures to manipulation
Original language description
A minimal reduction in strategic voter's knowledge about other voters' voting patterns severely limits her ability to strategically manipulate the voting outcome. In this paper I relax the implicit assumption made in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite's impossibility theorem about strategic voter's complete information about all other voters' preference profiles. Via a series of computation-based simulations I find that vulnerability to strategic voting is decreasing in the number of voters and increasing in thenumber of alternatives. Least vulnerable voting procedures are Condorcet-consistent procedures, followed by elimination procedures, while most prone to manipulation are the simplest rules. Strategic voting is vulnerable both to an absolute and relativereduction in amount of information.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Project
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Continuities
Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)<br>S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Publication year
2011
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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