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Voting in Central Banks: Theory versus Stylized Facts

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F16%3A10338404" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/16:10338404 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Alternative codes found

    RIV/00216208:11640/16:00471409

  • Result on the web

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0227" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0227</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0227" target="_blank" >10.1515/bejeap-2015-0227</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Voting in Central Banks: Theory versus Stylized Facts

  • Original language description

    The paper examines the ability of several alternative group decision-making models to generate proposing, voting and decision patterns matching those observed in the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee and the US Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee. A decision-making procedure, common to all the models, is to vote between adoption of the chairman's proposal and retention of the status-quo policy, with heterogeneous votes generated by private information of the models' monetary policy committee members. The members can additionally express reservations regarding the final committee decision. The three alternative models differ in the degree of informational influence between the chairman and the remaining members. We find that a "super-majoritarian" model, in which the chairman proposes a policy she knows would be accepted by a supermajority of the committee members, combined with allowance for reservations, closely replicates real-world decision-making patterns. The model predicts no rejections of chairman's proposals, low but non-trivial dissent, even during meetings where the chairman proposes no change in policy, and predictive power of the voting record of the whole committee regarding future monetary policy changes.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

  • CEP classification

    AH - Economics

  • OECD FORD branch

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/GBP402%2F12%2FG097" target="_blank" >GBP402/12/G097: DYME-Dynamic Models in Economics</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2016

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy

  • ISSN

    1935-1682

  • e-ISSN

  • Volume of the periodical

    16

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    4

  • Country of publishing house

    US - UNITED STATES

  • Number of pages

    62

  • Pages from-to

  • UT code for WoS article

    000395809400001

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85012865688