Voting in Central Banks: Theory versus Stylized Facts
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F16%3A10338404" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/16:10338404 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11640/16:00471409
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0227" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0227</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0227" target="_blank" >10.1515/bejeap-2015-0227</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Voting in Central Banks: Theory versus Stylized Facts
Original language description
The paper examines the ability of several alternative group decision-making models to generate proposing, voting and decision patterns matching those observed in the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee and the US Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee. A decision-making procedure, common to all the models, is to vote between adoption of the chairman's proposal and retention of the status-quo policy, with heterogeneous votes generated by private information of the models' monetary policy committee members. The members can additionally express reservations regarding the final committee decision. The three alternative models differ in the degree of informational influence between the chairman and the remaining members. We find that a "super-majoritarian" model, in which the chairman proposes a policy she knows would be accepted by a supermajority of the committee members, combined with allowance for reservations, closely replicates real-world decision-making patterns. The model predicts no rejections of chairman's proposals, low but non-trivial dissent, even during meetings where the chairman proposes no change in policy, and predictive power of the voting record of the whole committee regarding future monetary policy changes.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—
Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GBP402%2F12%2FG097" target="_blank" >GBP402/12/G097: DYME-Dynamic Models in Economics</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
ISSN
1935-1682
e-ISSN
—
Volume of the periodical
16
Issue of the periodical within the volume
4
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
62
Pages from-to
—
UT code for WoS article
000395809400001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85012865688