Crafting consensus

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F17%3A00479524" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/17:00479524 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Crafting consensus

Original language description

The paper analyzes the problem of a committee chair using favors at her disposal to maximize the likelihood that her proposal gains committee support. The favors increase the probability of a given member approving the chair’s proposal via a smooth voting function. The decision-making protocol is any quota voting rule. The paper characterizes the optimal allocation of any given level of favors and the optimal expenditure-minimizing level of favors. The optimal allocation divides favors uniformly among a coalition of the committee members. At a low level of favors, the coalition comprises all committee members. At a high level, it is the minimum winning coalition. The optimal expenditure level guarantees the chair certain support of the minimum winning coalition if favors are abundant and uncertain support of all committee members if favors are scarce, elitist or egalitarian committees are compatible with a strategic chair. The results are robust to changing the chair’s objectives and to alternative voting functions, and reconcile theoretical predictions with empirical observations about legislative bargaining experiments, lobby vote buying and executive lawmaking.

Czech name

—

Czech description

—

Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

50201 - Economic Theory

Project

<a href="/en/project/GP14-27902P" target="_blank" >GP14-27902P: Theory of proposal-making with uncertain acceptance</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year

2017

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Public Choice

ISSN

0048-5829

e-ISSN

—

Volume of the periodical

173

Issue of the periodical within the volume

1–2

Country of publishing house

US - UNITED STATES

Number of pages

32

Pages from-to

169-200

UT code for WoS article

000412988600009

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85027138863