Gambler’s fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F16%3A00472317" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/16:00472317 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11640/16:00463349
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Gambler’s fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
Original language description
We investigate the implications of imperfect best response—in combination with different assumptions about correct (QRE) or incorrect beliefs (Quantal-Gambler's Fallacy or QGF)—in the alternating offer multilateral bargaining game. We prove that a QRE of this game exists and characterize the unique solution to the proposer's problem—that is, the proposal observed most frequently in a QRE. We structurally estimate this model on data from laboratory experiments, and show that it explains behavior better than the model with perfect best response: receivers vote probabilistically; proposers allocate resources mostly within a minimum winning coalition of legislators but do not fully exploit their bargaining power. Incorporating history-dependent beliefs about the future distribution of proposal power into the QRE model (QGF) leads to an even better match with the data, as this model implies slightly lower shares to the proposer, maintaining similar or higher frequencies of minimum winning coalitions and similar voting behavior.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Games and Economic Behavior
ISSN
0899-8256
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
99
Issue of the periodical within the volume
September
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
20
Pages from-to
275-294
UT code for WoS article
000386194300019
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-84992093316