Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F18%3A10373113" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/18:10373113 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/61384399:31150/18:00051877
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161" target="_blank" >10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence
Original language description
This article experimentally examines two complex multi-unit auction mechanismsa simultaneous multi-round auction and its extension with combinatorial biddingthat offer the opportunity to communicate and thus collude. The general setting and parametrization originated in the 2013 Czech Spectrum Auction. The results suggest that the package bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Strikingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in the examined auction formats. A cheap-talk collusive agreement resulted in better allocation, as compared to the treatments without communication. The authors hypothesize that combinatorial bidding makes the decision-making of bidders too complicated and causes inefficiency, especially in auctions with large numbers of goods.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory

Publication year
2018
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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