Strategic Patience Revisited: The Counterforce Effect

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F19%3A10402188" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/19:10402188 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=V2MkJBk7-l" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=V2MkJBk7-l</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1694297" target="_blank" >10.1080/0163660X.2019.1694297</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Strategic Patience Revisited: The Counterforce Effect
Original language description
What can the United States do to eliminate the threat of a nuclear North Korea? In this article, I argue that the most promising policy towards North Korea is a return to strategic patience. Ongoing development of counterforce technologies such as new sensors, AI enabled automated target recognition, and hypersonic weapons undermine North Korea's nuclear threat. North Korea is in a poor position to compete with the development of counterforce technologies. Sooner or later, the costs and risks of keeping a nuclear arsenal will outweigh the benefits which nuclear weapons bring to North Korea. Pyongyang's incentives to accept complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs will increase in the future. Furthermore, if a deal cannot be worked out, a military solution will be much safer tomorrow than it is today.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50601 - Political science

Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2019
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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