Husserl's Phenomenology: From Pure Logic to Embodiment
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F23%3A10468124" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/23:10468124 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26147-3" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26147-3</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26147-3" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-031-26147-3</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Husserl's Phenomenology: From Pure Logic to Embodiment
Original language description
This text examines the many transformations in Husserl's phenomenology that his discoveries of the nature of appearing lead to. It offers a comprehensive look at the Logical Investigations' delimitation of the phenomenological field, and continues with Husserl's account of our consciousness of time. This volume examines Husserl's turn to transcendental idealism and the problems this raises for our recognition of other subjects. It details Husserl's account of embodiment and examines his theory of the instincts. Drawing from his published and unpublished manuscripts, it outlines his treatment of our mortality and the teleological character of our existence. The result is a genetic account of our selfhood, one that unifies Husserl's different claims about who and what we are.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
B - Specialist book
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2023
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
ISBN
978-3-031-26146-6
Number of pages
160
Publisher name
Springer
Place of publication
Cham
UT code for WoS book
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