On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11320%2F15%3A10318973" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11320/15:10318973 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0439-5" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0439-5</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0439-5" target="_blank" >10.1007/s00182-014-0439-5</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games
Original language description
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. A proper Shapley value assigns weights to players such that the corresponding weighted Shapley value of each player is equal to her weight. In this contribution we investigate these proper Shapley values in the context of monotone games. We prove their existence for all monotone transferable utility games and discuss other properties of this solution.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
BA - General mathematics
OECD FORD branch
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Project
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Continuities
Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2015
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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