The Shapley value, the Proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F20%3A00532808" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/20:00532808 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11320/20:10421895
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.11.003" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.11.003</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.11.003" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.orl.2019.11.003</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
The Shapley value, the Proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures
Original language description
In this note, we discuss two solutions for cooperative transferable utility games, namely the Shapley value and the Proper Shapley value. We characterize positive Proper Shapley values by affine invariance and by an axiom that requires proportional allocation of the surplus according to the individual singleton worths in generalized joint venture games. As a counterpart, we show that affine invariance and an axiom that requires equal allocation of the surplus in generalized joint venture games characterize the Shapley value.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory

Project
<a href="/en/project/GA17-19672S" target="_blank" >GA17-19672S: On Informational Aspects in Games</a><br>
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2020
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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