Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11320%2F18%3A10387434" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11320/18:10387434 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x" target="_blank" >10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Original language description
Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with group interests(1-7). According to the 'tragedy of the commons', these misalignments can lead to overexploitation and collapse of public resources. The resulting behaviours can be analysed with the tools of game theory(8). The theory of direct reciprocity(9-15) suggests that repeated interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous work has assumed that the public resource remains constant over time. Here we introduce the idea that the public resource is instead changeable and depends on the strategic choices of individuals. An intuitive scenario is that cooperation increases the public resource, whereas defection decreases it. Thus, cooperation allows the possibility of playing a more valuable game with higher payoffs, whereas defection leads to a less valuable game. We analyse this idea using the theory of stochastic games(16-19) and evolutionary game theory. We find that the dependence of the public resource on previous interactions can greatly enhance the propensity for cooperation. For these results, the interaction between reciprocity and payoff feedback is crucial: neither repeated interactions in a constant environment nor single interactions in a changing environment yield similar cooperation rates. Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and environment-either naturally occurring or designed-help to overcome social dilemmas.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—
Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)
Result continuities
Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2018
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Nature
ISSN
0028-0836
e-ISSN
—
Volume of the periodical
559
Issue of the periodical within the volume
7713
Country of publishing house
GB - UNITED KINGDOM
Number of pages
4
Pages from-to
246-249
UT code for WoS article
000438240900054
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85049775883