Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12310%2F17%3A43895469" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12310/17:43895469 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/60077344:_____/17:00469566
Result on the web
<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519317300103?via%3Dihub" target="_blank" >http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519317300103?via%3Dihub</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.01.10" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.01.10</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games
Original language description
Two most influential models of evolutionary game theory are the Hawk-Dove and Prisoner's dilemma models. The Hawk-Dove model explains evolution of aggressiveness, predicting individuals should be aggressive when the cost of fighting is lower than its benefit. As the cost of aggressiveness increases and outweighs benefits, aggressiveness in the population should decrease. Similarly, the Prisoner's dilemma models evolution of cooperation. It predicts that individuals should never cooperate despite cooperation leading to a higher collective fitness than defection. The question is then what are the conditions under which cooperation evolves? These classic matrix games, which are based on pair-wise interactions between two opponents with player payoffs given in matrix form, do not consider the effect that conflict duration has on payoffs. However, interactions between different strategies often take different amounts of time. In this article, we develop a new approach to an old idea that opportunity costs lost while engaged in an interaction affect individual fitness. When applied to the Hawk-Dove and Prisoner's dilemma, our theory that incorporates general interaction times leads to qualitatively different predictions. In particular, not all individuals will behave as Hawks when fighting cost is lower than benefit, and cooperation will evolve in the Prisoner's dilemma.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
10602 - Biology (theoretical, mathematical, thermal, cryobiology, biological rhythm), Evolutionary biology
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2017
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Journal of Theoretical Biology
ISSN
0022-5193
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
416
Issue of the periodical within the volume
MAR 7 2017
Country of publishing house
GB - UNITED KINGDOM
Number of pages
9
Pages from-to
199-207
UT code for WoS article
000396798400020
EID of the result in the Scopus database
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