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Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12310%2F17%3A43895469" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12310/17:43895469 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Alternative codes found

    RIV/60077344:_____/17:00469566

  • Result on the web

    <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519317300103?via%3Dihub" target="_blank" >http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519317300103?via%3Dihub</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.01.10" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.01.10</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games

  • Original language description

    Two most influential models of evolutionary game theory are the Hawk-Dove and Prisoner&apos;s dilemma models. The Hawk-Dove model explains evolution of aggressiveness, predicting individuals should be aggressive when the cost of fighting is lower than its benefit. As the cost of aggressiveness increases and outweighs benefits, aggressiveness in the population should decrease. Similarly, the Prisoner&apos;s dilemma models evolution of cooperation. It predicts that individuals should never cooperate despite cooperation leading to a higher collective fitness than defection. The question is then what are the conditions under which cooperation evolves? These classic matrix games, which are based on pair-wise interactions between two opponents with player payoffs given in matrix form, do not consider the effect that conflict duration has on payoffs. However, interactions between different strategies often take different amounts of time. In this article, we develop a new approach to an old idea that opportunity costs lost while engaged in an interaction affect individual fitness. When applied to the Hawk-Dove and Prisoner&apos;s dilemma, our theory that incorporates general interaction times leads to qualitatively different predictions. In particular, not all individuals will behave as Hawks when fighting cost is lower than benefit, and cooperation will evolve in the Prisoner&apos;s dilemma.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    10602 - Biology (theoretical, mathematical, thermal, cryobiology, biological rhythm), Evolutionary biology

Result continuities

  • Project

  • Continuities

    I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Others

  • Publication year

    2017

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Journal of Theoretical Biology

  • ISSN

    0022-5193

  • e-ISSN

  • Volume of the periodical

    416

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    MAR 7 2017

  • Country of publishing house

    GB - UNITED KINGDOM

  • Number of pages

    9

  • Pages from-to

    199-207

  • UT code for WoS article

    000396798400020

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database