Options Speak Louder Than Words: Strategic Negativity in Earnings Calls Prior to Option Grants
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11320%2F23%3A4LA4S2KI" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11320/23:4LA4S2KI - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://openaccess.nhh.no/nhh-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/3096032/masterthesis.pdf?sequence=1" target="_blank" >https://openaccess.nhh.no/nhh-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/3096032/masterthesis.pdf?sequence=1</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Options Speak Louder Than Words: Strategic Negativity in Earnings Calls Prior to Option Grants
Original language description
"We investigate whether executive compensation affects disclosure during earnings conference calls. In particular, we hypothesize that executives who have an upcoming option grant will use overly negative language in earnings calls, intending to temporarily depress their companies stock price and obtain a lower strike price on their options."
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
O - Miscellaneous
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
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Others
Publication year
2023
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů