Positivity of incomplete cooperative games revisited

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11320%2F25%3A10502310" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11320/25:10502310 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=.zg2eUqd.A" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=.zg2eUqd.A</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2025.107277" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.orl.2025.107277</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Positivity of incomplete cooperative games revisited
Original language description
We consider incomplete cooperative games, where only some coalitions' values are specified and others remain indeterminate. Focusing on positive extensions-fully defined cooperative games that agree with the partial data and have nonnegative dividends-we introduce a novel, two-stage dividend-assignment procedure that fully characterizes all such extensions. Our method offers a general criterion for positivity-extendability, introduces an explicit lower bound game, and provides an understanding of the structure of extreme points in the extension set. These contributions significantly expand the toolkit for theoretical analyses and practical computations of incomplete cooperative games, and also shed new light on properties of classical cooperative games.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory

Project
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Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2025
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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